Distributed mode now fails configuration validation unless both of these are configured:
internal_auth_token for discovery and internal commands.internal_use_tls: true with a broker certificate, private key, trusted CA,
and client server name for mutual TLS on discovery, the internal broker
listener, and Raft transport.allow_insecure_cluster_transport: true is an explicit escape hatch for
isolated test fixtures only. It must not be used for production.
TLS Raft framing is not wire-compatible with the previous plaintext Raft transport. Do not perform a mixed plaintext/TLS rolling upgrade. Validate all certificates and advertised DNS names first, stop the cluster cleanly, update all members to the secured build and configuration, then start the complete quorum. Verify discovery membership, Raft leadership, in-sync replicas, group registration, committed offsets, and readiness before restoring client traffic.
Each broker certificate must be signed by the configured internal CA and valid
for the advertised hostname used by peers. The configured
internal_tls_server_name must match the certificate SAN. A discovery bind
failure, TLS validation failure, Raft initialization error, or missing security
configuration prevents readiness instead of falling back to plaintext.
The Kubernetes production chart treats the public broker listener as a
separate security boundary. It requires a client-listener TLS Secret and a
SASL user Secret, enables both controls on port 9000, and rejects an insecure
render unless the test-only clientSecurity.allowInsecure=true escape hatch is
explicitly set. Internal mTLS credentials do not grant client API access.